\u27Reflections on Italy’s contemporary approaches to cultural diversity: the exclusion of the ‘Other’ from a supposed notion of ‘Italianness’ by Armillei, Riccardo
  
 
 
 
Armillei, Riccardo 2016, 'Reflections on Italy’s contemporary approaches to cultural diversity: the 
exclusion of the ‘Other’ from a supposed notion of ‘Italianness’, Australian and New Zealand journal of 
European studies, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 34-48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the published version. 
 
 
© 2016, Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner. 
 
The editorial board of the Australia New Zealand Journal of European Studies (ANZJES) consents to 
papers published by Deakin researchers in ANZJES being made available for access on the Deakin 
Research Online repository. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091516 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Copyright @ 2016 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
http://www.eusanz.org/ANZJES/index.html 
Vol8 (2) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
‘Reflections on Italy’s contemporary approaches to 
cultural diversity: The exclusion of the ‘Other’ from a 
supposed notion of ‘Italianness’. 
 
RICCARDO ARMILLEI 
The Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, 
Deakin University, Australia 
r.armillei@deakin.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
For many years Italy has been described as a country of emigration. Only since the 1970s Italy has 
moved from being a net exporter of migrants to a net importer. Despite growing cultural and 
religious diversity, the implications of the pluralisation of the Italian society on national identity 
have been largely ignored. Italy has been recently described as a country without an established 
model of integration or pluralism.1 The so called ‘Italian way’ towards cultural diversity remained 
predominantly theoretical in character and not supported officially, in the sense of being 
incorporated into the nation’s history (as it is in Canada or Australia). The rise of ‘ethnonationalism’ 
and legacies of past colonialism contributed to create an institutional notion of supposed 
‘Italianness’, which is based on the exclusion of the ‘Other’. During the Liberal and Fascist periods, 
colonialism was used to create and re-produce a strong sense of nationhood, re-composing the many 
internal divisions by racialising ‘otherness’ outside rather than inside the nation’s borders. This 
study suggests that, due to historical amnesia and a weak national identity, a similar logic is now 
informing the implementation of anti-immigration policies in Italy.     
 
Keywords: Italy, ‘Italianness’, cultural diversity, ‘Ethnonationalism’. 
Introduction 
For many years Italy has been described as a country of emigration and only in the 
last few decades there was an inversion of this trend. Since the 1970s, though, it has 
moved from being a ‘country of mass emigration to a country of mass immigration’.2 
Today Italy is among the EU countries with the highest volume of immigrants on its 
																																																								
1 S. Allievi, ‘Immigration, religious diversity and recognition of differences: The Italian way to multiculturalism’, 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, vol. 21, no. 6, 2014, pp. 724-737. 
2 S.V. Love, ‘Language testing, “integration” and subtractive multilingualism in Italy: challenges for adult 
immigrant second language and literacy education’, Current Issues in Language Planning, vol. 16, no. 1-2, 2015, 
pp. 26-42. 
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territory (it is ranked third behind Germany and the UK; Eurostat 2016).3 The foreign 
population present in Italy as at 31 December 2015 can be quantified at 5.026.153 (or 
8.3% 6,5 per cent of the Italian population), with Romanians (1,151,395), Albanians 
(467,687), Moroccans (437,485), Chinese (271,330), and Ukrainians (230,728) 
among the most numerous minority groups.4 Immigrants also contribute for about 
8.7% per cent of the Gross domestic product.5 Despite that, ‘significant and vocal 
segments of autochthonous population do not perceive long-term immigrants as fully 
a part of Italian society’, as current political debates and episodes of intolerance and 
xenophobia against them may clearly suggest.6 This attitude may be particularly due 
to the attention that media tends to place almost exclusively on the negative aspects 
of this phenomenon, such as illegal immigration and crime.7  
Although in the last few decades the Italian society has become increasingly diverse, 
an official policy addressing the issue of a ‘multicultural citizenship’ is still missing. 
In those European countries where immigration flows have been higher, such as 
France, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands, multiculturalism has been 
promoted until recently as the best way to deal with cultural diversity.8 Within these 
contexts, as Garau9 argues, ‘the construction of coherent responses to immigration 
also triggered a public discussion on national identity’. On the other hand in Italy, an 
‘emergency’ approach towards immigration is constantly reiterated by the 
government, with mainstream society’s negative perception of migrants10 providing 
an adequate back-up to the implementation of repressive measures. Over the years, 
the Italian government has generally avoided recognising the cultural and religious 
impacts of the presence of immigrant populations.11 Cultural diversity was never 
seriously considered, let alone contributing to a re-definition of Italian identity in 
pluralistic terms. Interculturalism, which was introduced in the 1990s as a way to 
respond to the growing presence of foreign students within the Italian educational 
																																																								
3 Eurostat, Statistiche sulle migrazioni internazionali e sulle popolazioni di origine stranieri [Statistics on 
international migrations and on foreign populations], 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/it#Stranieri 
4 Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Anno 2015: Bilancio Demografico Nazionale [Year 2015: National demographic 
evaluation], 2016, http://www.istat.it/it/files/2016/06/Bilancio-demografico-2015-
1.pdf?title=Bilancio+demografico+nazionale+-+10%2Fgiu%2F2016+-+Testo+integrale.pdf 
5 Centro Studi Confindustria, Immigrati: Da emergenza a opportunità [Immigrants: From emergency to 
opportunity], 2016,  
http://www.confindustria.it/Conf2004/DbDoc2004.nsf/0/255BA632FD37DAEBC1257FDB004D5B56/$file/SEg
iu16_Immigrazione.pdf 
6 D.L. Zinn, ‘“Loud and clear”: the G2 Second Generations network in Italy’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 
vol. 16, no. 3, 2011, pp. 373-385. 
7 European Migration Network, The impact of immigration on Italy’s society, European Commission, 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-
studies/illegally-resident/it-1st_study_en.pdf>. 
8 R. Emmett Tyrrell, ‘Multiculturalism has failed’, The American Spectator, 2011, February 17,  
http://spectator.org/archives/2011/02/17/multiculturalism-has-failed 
9 E. Garau, Politics of National Identity in Italy: Immigration and ‘Italianità’, Routledge, New York, 2014. 
10  According to a recent survey, 67% of the people interviewed shared the opinion that immigrants pose a threat 
to national security. Only a small minority of the respondents (2%) considers immigration as a resource for the 
country; Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Gli italiani e le migrazioni: percezione vs realtà [Italians 
and migration: perception vs. reality], 2015, http://www.ispionline.it/it/articoli/articolo/emergenzesviluppo-
europa-italia-global-governance/gli-italiani-e-le-migrazioni-percezione-vs-realta-13562. Another study confirms 
the existence of a widespread anti-immigration sentiment in Italy; Eumetra Monterosa, L'opinione degli italiani 
sull'arrivo degli immigrati [The opinion of Italians on the arrival of immigrants], 2016, 
https://www.eumetramr.com/it/lopinione-degli-italiani-sullarrivo-degli-immigrati.  
11 Allievi, op. cit., p. 724. 
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system, remained ‘predominantly theoretical in character and not supported 
officially, in the sense of being incorporated into the nation’s history’.12 
Despite being widely criticized and contested, a number of writers (e.g. Giovanni 
Sartori, Oriana Fallaci, Baget Bozzo)13  have often focused their attention on the 
supposed dangers of cultural differences (nowadays with a specific focus on the 
Muslim ‘threat’). Politicians and media make also free use of xenophobic rhetoric in 
addressing immigration, often portraying them as a mere security issue.14 This trend, 
which evokes the ‘clash of civilizations’ theorized by Huntington,15 could be linked to 
the Government’s ‘incapacity to deal with a shameful past and its unbroken ties’.16 
According to Mellino,17 for instance, although Italy has a past as a colonial nation, 
with colonial discourse having played ‘a central role in constructing the national 
identity, from the post-unification period onwards’,18 the Italian intellectual scene 
has been characterised by a scanty and late development of postcolonial studies. The 
lack of a ‘colonial memory of racism’,19 together with a tendency to ignore or deny the 
reality of moments of national shame and historical revisionism (such as the Nazi-
Fascist atrocities), 20  have contributed to create and perpetuate the myth of the 
Italians as ‘brava gente’ (good people).21 In turn, this has produced a perception of 
‘otherness’ biased by fear, while favouring stricter anti-immigration policies as a 
response to it. 
This study will offer important analyses of the historical and racial issues 
surrounding the treatment of ‘Othered’ communities in Italy. It will suggest that the 
dominant approach towards cultural diversity in Italy is influenced by historical 
amnesia and revisionism. In this context, the implementation of selective ethnic 
policies (for instance towards the Romani/’Gypsy’ people) serves the purpose of 
creating an institutional notion of supposed ‘Italianness’, which is clearly based on 
the exclusion of the ‘Other’. In other words, the construction of specific ‘Others’– out 
of internal differences and ‘otherness’ (see the well-established North/South divide)– 
is allowing the reification of an alleged homogeneous ‘Italian ethnic majority’. This 
became also the pretext for implementing a form of democracy with a strong ethno-
nationalist drive, where different ethnic groups are viewed as unassimilable into the 
majority population.22 The next sections will help to pinpoint the existence of long-
																																																								
12 R. Armillei, ‘A multicultural Italy?’, in F Mansouri (ed.), Cultural, Religious and Political Contestations: The 
Multicultural Challenge, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2015, pp. 135-151. 
13 K. Calavita, T. Tsuda, P. Martin & J. Hollifield, Italy: Immigration, Economic Flexibility, and Integration, 
University of California, Irvine, 2006; R. Guolo, Xenofobi e xenofili. Gli italiani e l'Islam, Laterza, Roma, 2003. 
14 R. Cere, ‘Globalization vs. localization: anti-immigrant and hate discourses in Italy’ in M. Ardizzoni and M. 
Ferrari (Eds.), Beyond monopoly: globalization and contemporary Italian media. Critical media studies. 
Lexington Books, 2009; Garau, op. cit., p. 213. 
15 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the world order. Simon and Schuster, New 
York, USA, 1996. 
16 R. Armillei, ‘“Emergenza nomadi”: Institutional continuities in Italian government policy towards the 
Romanies’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 28-42, 2014a, p. 42. 
17 M. Mellino, ‘Italy and Postcolonial Studies’, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, vol. 
8, no. 3, pp. 461-471, 2006. 
18 Ibid., p. 461. 
19 Allievi, op. cit., p. 733. 
20 I. Clough Marinaro, ‘Between surveillance and exile: Biopolitics and the Roma in Italy’, Bulletin of Italian 
Politics, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009, pp. 265-287. 
21 P. Pezzino, ‘The Italian resistance between history and memory,’ Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, 2005, pp. 396-412. 
22 S. Smooha, ‘The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’. Nations and Nationalism, 
Vol. 8, No. 4, 2002, pp. 475-503; S. Smooha, ‘The model of ethnic democracy: Response to Danel’, The Journal of 
Israeli History, vol. 28, no. 1, 2009, pp. 55–62. 
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term continuities between contemporary Italy and the post-unification period. An in-
depth literature review of the areas of interest was conducted examining the previous 
and current work of experts in the field of Italian history and identity to illustrate the 
contemporary Government approach towards ‘Othered’ communities.23 By doing so, 
this study will provide an understanding of the reasons behind the persistent 
adoption of emergency measures when dealing with issues that are deemed to 
represent a threat to the character of state identity.     
The ‘Liberal period’: racialising ‘otherness’ outside the country 
Italian political unification was the result of the Northern imperialism rather than of 
romantic nationalism of popular insurrection.24 The aftermath of the conquest of the 
peninsula by the Kingdom of Sardinia, the so called ‘Liberal period’, was indeed 
‘illiberal’ and unpopular. This was characterized by the explosion of a first, mainly 
forgotten, ‘civil war’ in the South, which was ultimately suppressed by government 
force.25 At that time, no agrarian reform was launched in order to gain the support of 
the peasants. No union between town and country was established. The industrial 
north (the ‘city’) was rather exploiting the rural southern peasantry (the ‘country’), 
mainly through high taxation. This situation paved the way to what later became 
known as the ‘Southern Question’, a well-rooted industrialised North and 
underdeveloped South dualism, which persisted ever since.26 Peasants were basically 
turned into a ‘colonial population’.27 The failure to bridge the existing gap between 
the North and South of Italy, constituted only one of the challenges that the new 
Italian state was called to face. The government of the new country was also unable to 
deal with one of the major ‘losers’ of the unification process, the Catholic Church, 
which since the Council of Vienna in 1815 had nurtured visions of Italian unification 
under the auspices of the papacy.28  
In a deeply divided country the development of an imperialistic endeavor soon came 
to be understood as the best way to establish a new sense of national unity. 
Particularly in the final years of ‘Liberal Italy’ (1870-1914), racism, colonialism and 
imperialism became increasingly defining traits of the Italian national identity.29 Italy 
was a late arriver on the colonial scene and its colonial ventures were quite limited 
compared to the UK, France, Belgium and others. On top of that, the Italian military 
campaigns were extremely unsuccessful (such as the defeat at Adowa in 1896 against 
the Ethiopians and the one in Libya in 1915). After the decision to participate in the 
First World War, a deep post-war economic crisis, a ‘mutilated victory’ and the risk of 
a socialist revolution (1919-21 The Two Red Years), contributed to the establishment 
of a totalitarian state.30 The major strength of the new regime was ‘Mussolini’s ability 
																																																								
23 J.W. Creswell and V.L. Plano Clark, Designing and conducting mixed methods research, 2nd edn, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, 2011. 
24 L. Re, ‘Italians and the invention of race: The poetics and politics of difference in the struggle over Libya, 1890-
1913’, California Italian Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010, pp. 1-58. 
25 J.F. Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy, 2005, http://www.e-reading-
lib.org/bookreader.php/135877/The_Fascist_Experience_in_Italy.pdf 
26 N. Carter, ‘Rethinking the Italian liberal state’, Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011, pp. 225-245.  
27 N. Carter, Modern Italy in historical perspective, 2010, http://www.bloomsburyacademic.com/view  
/ModernItaly_9781849662109/preface-ba-9781849662109-preface-001.xml, Debates, para. 14. 
28 P.R. D’Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism, The 
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, USA, 2004.  
29 Re, op. cit., p.8. 
30 K. Roberts, The rise of Italian Fascism, 2010, 
http://gen2.ca/DBHS/ScholarlyArticles/Danny%20Maccagnone.pdf. 
Armillei, ANZJES 8(2) 
 
38 
to re-unite the country through a subtle strategy of re-composition of the many 
internal divisions, which had been exacerbated over the years by the failures of the 
previous liberal governments’.31 Through the promotion of an ardent nationalism 
Mussolini was finally able to create a collective sense of belonging to a distinct racial 
family, ethnic community, or ‘stock’.32 The Libyan war, in particular, while reflecting 
the long-term continuities between Liberal and Fascist Italy, came to symbolize this 
achievement, strengthening a new shared identity through the logic of racialising 
‘otherness outside rather than inside the nation’s borders’.33  
Despite Mussolini’s ability in forging the nation as never before, the degree of 
popular consent enjoyed by the Fascist regime is to this day still debated.34 The civil 
war exploded between 1943–1945 is evidence of a ‘country of blood, violence, and 
fractures within society’. 35  In order to accelerate Italy’s democratic transition, 
avoiding to inflame the revolutionary impulse, the legitimacy of the post-war Italian 
order required the minimization of the preceding era and its influence on later 
events. The absence of a war crime international tribunal in Italy, on the model of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in Germany and Japan respectively, allowed many 
fascists to go unpunished for their war crimes in occupied Europe and Africa, while 
promoting the myth of the Italians as ‘brava gente’.36 This has allowed historians like 
Benedetto Croce to define Fascism as a mere ‘parenthesis’ in Italian history.37 With 
the Cold War becoming the main determinant of international relations in the 
postwar world and the consolidation of the anti-communist bloc a necessary 
imperative, ‘the issue of Italian war criminality was conveniently forgotten’.38  For 
this reason, Italians have never come to terms with their past and true knowledge of 
history is still struggling to develop a shared understanding.   
Surely the Fascist era is recognized as the darkest page in Italian history. Yet, it is not 
until recently that the war crimes of the Fascist regime were submitted to full 
scrutiny. National historical memory of the tragic events of the Second World War 
under Mussolini’s regime and the partisan Resistenza (resistance) still represents a 
highly contested terrain.39 For instance, for many years post-war Italian identity, and 
the idea of Italy as a free, democratic country, were almost entirely shaped by the 
narrative of the Resistenza. This perception ‘was considered a unitary set of actions 
(particularly those of the partisans) that promoted staunch opposition to Nazi-
Fascism and found an ample consensus amongst the population’. 40 In the last few 
decades, though, a small number of pioneering studies have emphasized the sharp 
criticism of the Resistenza and the partisan efforts, revealing the existence of a 
																																																								
31 Armillei, ‘“Emergenza nomadi”, op. cit., p. 35. 
32 Re, op. cit., p. 8. 
33 Ibid., p. 8. 
34 A. Mammone, ‘A daily revision of the past: Fascism, anti-Fascism, and memory in contemporary Italy’, Modern 
Italy, vol. 11, no. 2, 2006, pp. 211-226.   
35 Ibid., p. 214. 
36 Pezzino, op. cit., p. 402. 
37 R.A. Ventresca, ‘Debating the meaning of fascism in contemporary Italy’, Modern Italy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 
189-209. 
38 E. G. H. Pedaliu, ‘Britain and the ‘hand-over’ of Italian war Criminals to Yugoslavia, 1945-48’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004, pp. 503-529.  
39 A.C. Bull, Italian neofascism: The strategy of tension and the politics of non-reconciliation. Berghahn Books, 
2011. 
40 L. Tavarnesi and B. David, ‘A Trial for the “Past”, a Memory for the “Present”: History and Memory in Italy’, 
European Forum at the Hebrew University, Working Paper 120, 2013, 
http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/Tavarnesi-Ben%20David%20for%20web.pdf, p. 16. 
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‘divided memory’, as Tavarnesi and David named it. 41  Interestingly, the heated 
debates on Fascism and the Resistenza, and its pivotal role in the definition of the 
national character, have prevented the public discourse from rethinking a supposed 
‘Italianness’ in more pluralist terms. In other words, the changes which occurred 
within mainstream society, which are now less homogeneous and static from an 
ethno-cultural point of view,42  have not yet been incorporated into the nation’s 
identity.   
The Fascist legacy with post-war policymaking 
Since 1945, almost the entire period of the Cold War, the Italian political scene was 
dominated by governments lead by the Christian Democracy (DC). The so called 
‘strategy of tension,’ which was coordinated by the American intelligence CIA and 
part of a larger NATO plan in Europe also known as ‘stay-behind’,43 enabled the DC 
to remain firmly in power. Called to form a ‘front state’ in the Cold War era,44 with the 
aim to avoid both communists and neo-fascists to get access to power, the DC’s 
strategy had been always quite contradictory. Although from the 1950s legal bans 
were introduced in order to forbid the re-organisation in any form of the dissolved 
Fascist Party, neo-Fascist movements were actually helped by the ‘complacent’ 
attitude of the ruling DC who used neo-Fascist movements as an anti-Communist 
tool.45 In fact, one of the most controversial aspects of the ‘stay-behind’ strategy was 
the involvement of former fascist militants and organizations, such as the ‘New 
Order’. During the so called ‘Years of Lead’, the period from the late 1960s till the 
early 1980s, there were at least four failed known coup d'état attempts possibly 
aiming at establishing a military state. 46  During this period, both left- and right wing 
organizations were responsible for terrorist attacks. However, with the ultimate goal 
of creating an anti-communist climate and increase the public support for the state 
those conducted by right wing groups, were falsely blamed on left-wing groups, with 
the hidden support of secret services and public institutions.47   
According to Armillei,48 ‘although it was officially celebrated as a democratic political 
system, the Italian “First Republic” from 1948 until 1992 perpetuated an 
authoritarian government approach’. With its secretive and systematic use of un-
democratic tools echoing the Fascist regime,49 this period has been interpreted as a 
‘de facto colonization of the Italian state by the DC’.50 In the 1990s the ‘First Republic’ 
came to an end after the ‘Mani pulite’ (clean hands) scandal, an investigation which 
																																																								
41 Ibid. 
42 Garau, op. cit., pp. 212-213. 
43 C. Celani, ‘Strategy of tension: The case of Italy’, Executive Intelligence Review, vol. 31, no. 12, 2004, pp. 34-39. 
44 J.W Müller, ‘The paradoxes of post-war Italian political thought’, Princeton University, 2008, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/HEI-ITA-Thought-JWMueller-22Sept2008-pdf.pdf 
45 Pollard, op. cit., pp. 140-141. 
46 According to Gallego, for instance, a series of international events–the Cuban revolution, the defeat of the 
French army in Indo-China, Gaullism’s ‘soft’ coup, the setting up of military dictatorships in Brazil, Bolivia, 
Argentina and Peru–were all part of a “chain of vigilance” enacted by the NATO (F. Gallego, The extreme right in 
Italy: From the Italian social movement to post-fascism, 1999,  
http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1295/?sequence=1. The existence of a “secret armies’ network” 
was revealed only in 1990, when communism stopped representing a threat for Western nation-states (see P. 
Willan, Paolo Emilio Taviani. The Guardian, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news 
/2001/jun/21/guardianobituaries.philipwillan). 
47 Celani, op. cit. p.38. 
48 Armillei, “Emergenza nomadi”, p. 38. 
49 Pollard, op. cit., pp. 139. 
50 Müller, op. cit., p. 8. 
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uncovered the existence of a well-rooted mechanism of institutional corruption.51 Yet, 
a moral regeneration of Italian politics, as was expected, never really occurred: “the 
political class has only partially ‘renewed’ itself, with a large number of politicians 
being ‘recycled’ from the parties of the ‘First Republic’”.52 The creation of a centre-
right coalition led by Berlusconi, in the period before the elections of 27 March 1994, 
drew together very different political forces, such as the post-fascist right-wing 
‘Alleanza Nazionale’, the ‘Lega Nord’ (Northern League), and the Christian 
Democratic Centre, all united around the re-emergence of an anti-communist 
message.53 Without the expected ‘de-freezing’ of civil war cleavages,54 the idea that 
Italy naturally shifted from a ‘First’ to a ‘Second Republic’ has thus been questioned.55 
To this day, the Italian democratic system is still highly polarized.56   
Interestingly, until 1994 Chiarini argued that Italy was ‘the only Western democracy 
in which a political force that unmistakably harks back to fascism can be observed in 
the institutions of the state’.57 More than a decade later, Berlusconi’s last government 
(May 2008 - November 2011) was defined as ‘the most right-wing cabinet since the 
Second World War’.58  He owned the largest private television company in Italy, 
Mediaset, and while serving as Prime Minister, Berlusconi wielded ‘considerable 
editorial influence over the three channels of State television service, known 
collectively by the acronym RAI’.59 A growing concern regarding the role of the Italian 
media in disseminating ‘ideas of racial superiority or incitement to racial hatred’60 
was especially stressed during his Fourth Cabinet. In fact, after 2008 national 
elections Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition launched a massive campaign on security 
and immigration.61 Nevertheless, manifestations of racism and xenophobia in Italy, 
cannot be only ascribed to right-wing movements, governments or parties. For 
instance, contemporary discourses centered on some sort of racial superiority thus 
derives from a well-established ‘tradition’ of racism, in which the left-wing and liberal 
press find their place as well. 62  For instance, the introduction of the so called 
																																																								
51 A. Vannucci, ‘The controversial legacy of “mani pulite”: A critical analysis of Italian corruption and anti-
corruption policies, Bulletin of Italian Politics, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009, pp. 233-264.  
52 D. Della Porta and A. Vannucci, ‘Corruption and anti-Corruption: The political defeat of “Clean Hands” in Italy’, 
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, 2007, pp. 830-853. 
53 I. Diamanti, ‘The Italian centre-right and centre-left: Between parties and “the party”’. West European Politics, 
Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007, pp. 733-762. 
54 N. Sitter, ‘Civil war politics – the ‘first’ Italian republic: The institutionalization of the civil war cleavage in 
post-1945 Italian party politics’, paper presented at the 50th Annual Conference of the Political Studies 
Association, London, UK, 2000. 
55 P. Edwards, ‘“Alternation? What Alternation?” The Second Republic and the challenge of democratic 
consolidation’ Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2011, pp. 319-342. 
56 G. Ieraci, ‘From Polarized Pluralism to Polarized Bipolarism: Party System and Patterns of Competition in 
Contemporary Italy’, Società Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2012, http://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2012/giuseppe-
ieraci-1221.pdf 
57 R. Chiarini, ‘The extreme right in Italy’, in N Langenbacher & B Schellenberg (eds.), Is Europe on the “right” 
path? Right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, Germany, 
2011, pp. 141-157. 
58 L. Fekete, ‘The Italian general election and its aftermath’, European Race Bulletin, no. 64, 2008, pp. 2-15.  
59 Human Rights Watch, Everyday intolerance: Racist and xenophobic violence in Italy, Human Rights Watch, 
2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0311WebRevised.pdf, p. 10. 
60 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Eightieth session. Consideration of reports submitted 
by States parties under article 9 of the convention. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination: Italy, OHCHR, 2012, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.ITA.CO.16-18.pdf, p. 5. 
61 G. Sciortino, Diversity and the European public sphere: The case of Italy, Eurosphere Country Reports, Online 
Country Report no. 13, 2010, http://eurospheres.org/files/2010/06/Italy.pdf 
62 Re, op. cit., p. 2. 
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‘Emergenza Nomadi’ (Nomad Emergency) targeting Romani camp-dwellers was the 
result of a bipartisan approach (see next section).  
Broadly speaking, right-wing political alignments in Italy has the historical tendency 
to fuel racist tropes, particularly in relation to issues such as crime and security.63 For 
half a century (and more) the ‘Right’ was ‘synonymous with Fascism’.64 In the last two 
decades, the right-wing separatist party ‘Lega Nord’, one of Berlusconi’s closest allies, 
often made immigrants’ presence a security problem. Together with this nationalist 
movement, right-wing party ‘Alleanza Nazionale’ (AN)65 and a number of assorted 
fascistic organisations, such as Casa Pound, Forza Nuova, Militia and Contro Tempo, 
have emerged in Italian politics during the 1990s.66 As reported by Sigona, ‘the old 
dichotomy which sees “security” as a prerogative of the right-wing and “solidarity” of 
the left-wing’67 was disrupted by the introduction of Emergency decree no. 181/2007 
under a centre-left national administration. This was one of a series of policy 
proposals labelled ‘Pacchetto Sicurezza’ (Security Pact), which former Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi had issued after the murder of Giovanna Reggiani supposedly 
committed by a Romanian Romani in the city of Rome. The main feature of the 
decree was the introduction of certain residence conditions for non-citizens, which 
deepened insecurity surrounding those undocumented migrants.  
Racializing the ‘enemies within’: Ethno-nationalism at play 
What emerged so far is the existence of strong continuities between pre- and post-
war policy making. The lack of an in-depth and cohesive historical analysis aiming at 
showing similarities and common features of these different political stages, together 
with an underdeveloped field of research around Italian colonial past, the Fascist era 
and their influence on later events, represented significant impediments to a 
comprehensive understanding of contemporary ethnocentric and anti-immigrant 
policies. The next two sections will thus provide concrete examples of a well-rooted 
discriminatory attitude affecting all nationalities and ethnic groups. The Romanies 
and ‘boat people’ represent the clearest examples of the complex and contradictory 
approach adopted by public institutions, which oscillates between a vague sense of 
solidarity and a policy of exclusion.68 On the one hand, the Italian Government, in 
conformity with international law and cooperation, introduced several measures to 
tackle the causes of marginalisation and to improve the social inclusion of ‘Othered’ 
communities. On the other hand, immigration (and ‘cultural diversity’ more broadly) 
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is handled as security issue through the adoption of emergency measures, rather than 
a resource and an integral part of the nation’s cultural fabric. 
The Romani peoples in Italy: Between ‘campisation’ and lack of cultural recognition  
The Romani presence on the Italian peninsula can be dated back to the 15th century. 
Since then, the ‘zingaro’ (an Italian derogatory term for ‘Gipsy’) has always been 
characterised as the outsider par excellence, forced to play the role of a ‘guest’ and 
live out a condition of eternal ‘semi-clandestinità’ (semi-illegality).69 Especially after 
the ‘Risorgimento’ (or Resurgence), the new unified Italian nation-state introduced 
policies specifically directed at controlling ‘vagabonds’ and, more broadly, ‘socially 
dangerous’ groups, such as the Romanies.70 They became the main catalyst for all 
fears harboured by the Italian elite for the purity of a putative national identity. As in 
other parts of Europe, in Italy the pinnacle of segregational practices against 
Romanies was reached early in the 1940s when they were interned in concentration 
camps.71 Notwithstanding the terrible price paid by this population, Italy has not yet 
officially recognized its responsibility in the genocide of Romani peoples during the 
Fascist Era. 72  For many years it was commonly believed that Fascism targeted 
Romanies ‘exclusively as a problem of public order and not as a racial issue, unlike 
the Nazi regime’,73 leaving behind the idea that Fascism was lesser evil than Nazism.74 
In addition, the Romanies have been always denied compensation for their genocide. 
As a matter of fact, they have been almost completely excluded from Italian history, 
as reported in previous studies.75  
The situation of Romani peoples in Italy provides a clear example of the failure of the 
Government in guaranteeing equal treatment for all ethnic groups. Since the 1970s, 
the Italian government has addressed the Romani issue in terms of ‘Problema 
Nomadi’ (Nomads Problem).76 Today, public institutions still tend to categorise these 
peoples as ‘nomads’ or unsettled immigrants, although half of them are actual Italian 
citizens. 77  Because of their supposed ‘unsettledness’, they have not yet been 
recognised as a ‘minoranza storico-linguistica’ (historic-linguistic minority)—like 
numerous other well-established ethnic groups—a status that would enhance and 
protect their language and culture.78 In a work published in 2000 by the European 
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), Italy was iconically defined as ‘Campland’, the only 
country in Europe promoting a policy of segregating its Romani population inside so 
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called ‘campi nomadi’ (nomad camps).79 More than a decade later the strategy of 
housing Romani peoples in ‘ghetto-like urban camps’80 still represents the pivotal 
measure used by the Italian government to ensure the ‘inclusion’ of this minority 
group. Interestingly, only a small part of Romani peoples actually lives in camps and 
just 3 per cent of all the Romanies in Italy still maintains a ‘nomadic’ life style.81  
The implementation of the ‘Emergenza Nomadi’ can be seen as the symbolic 
expression of the tendency to describe them as unwilling or unable to settle within 
the host society.82 In 2008, in clear continuity with previous left-wing governments, 
the Berlusconi right-wing coalition implemented a state of emergency which 
described and handled the Romani issue as a ‘natural disaster’.83 In 2011, responding 
to a larger European Union’s initiative, the Italian government launched its ‘National 
Strategy’ introducing a number of measures to enhance their social inclusion. This 
commitment, though, which aimed to overcome the emergency approach adopted 
during the previous years, remained mostly on paper. On May 2, 2013, the Court of 
Cassation, Italy’s highest court, ultimately declared unfounded, unwarranted and 
unlawful the ‘Emergenza Nomadi’. Nevertheless, political and ideological attacks on 
Romanies continue. In addition, as conveyed in a recent report issued by the 
European Roma Rights Centre (2014), housing, employment, education and health 
projects are still inadequate to the challenge of achieving an authentic inclusion of 
Romanies.84 Today, it is still politically acceptable to institutionalize Romanies in 
‘campi nomadi’ and to proclaim a ‘state of emergency’ with both major political blocs’ 
endorsement. This may suggest that Fascist-Nazi persecutions of Romani minority 
groups during the Second World War are neglected or simply forgotten events.85 
Fears of an immigrant invasion and criminalizing attitudes  
One of the major issues in Italy is that there is no ‘organic’ policy of inclusion in all 
fields of society and the prevailing trend is to devise policies promoting a balance 
between the safeguarding of the national identity and a vaguely defined idea of 
integration.86 In 1998 the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI) had already concluded that ‘in Italy there is no general legislation to counter 
racial or ethnic discrimination’.87 Although thereafter progress has been made in a 
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number of areas, there are still issues that continue to rise concern, which clearly 
appears in a recent report published by ECRI:88 both criminal law provisions against 
racism and anti-discrimination provisions are rarely applied; there is widespread use 
of racist and xenophobic discourse in politics, particularly targeting Blacks, Africans, 
Muslims, Romanies, Romanians, asylum seekers and migrants in general. Racism 
and discrimination on ethnic grounds therefore come clearly into view and Italian 
authorities have acted ineffectively to counteract human rights abuse. Rather, they 
have periodically adopted a highly restrictive immigration policy approach. For 
instance in 2008 a right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi capitalized on fears about 
immigrants and public safety concerns to win elections.89  
Since then, despite its obligations under international human rights laws, the Italian 
government kept reinforcing discriminatory measures against immigrants, which 
became a security issue for the nation.90 A ‘moral panic’ approach is particularly 
visible with regards to the arrival of ‘boat people’ which produced alarm among 
Italians fearing an immigrant invasion. Expressions such as ‘human tsunami’ and 
‘human flood’ are often used in order to implement emergency policy measures and a 
security regime.91 According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles,92 Italy 
currently records the highest number of arrivals by sea. Yet boat arrivals represent 
only a fraction of the undocumented migrants residing in Italy. In fact, the majority 
of irregular migration consists of people arriving ‘by plane or land, or as tourists who 
subsequently work and overstay’.93 The migration cooperation announced with Libya 
in May 2009 is a clear example of the government’s willingness to set aside human 
rights to advance populist anti-migrant policies:   
the government began unilaterally interdicting boat migrants on the high seas 
and returning them summarily to Libya, with no screening to identify refugees, 
the sick or injured, pregnant women, unaccompanied children, victims of 
trafficking, or others in need to assistance, in breach of human rights and 
refugee law.94   
Until now, political debate on this issue and the practices adopted by the Italian 
government were generally about preserving national security and ‘stopping the 
boats’, extraterritorial processing and repatriation, rather than about human rights 
and global responsibilities. Even though ‘boat arrivals’ make up only a small 
proportion of ‘illegal’ immigrants, 95  the growing popular perception is of being 
‘swamped’ by ‘irregular’ maritime arrivals. In addition, there is nowadays a 
perception that ethnicity and crime are connected, reinforced by a negative discourse 
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about immigration. This concern is exaggerated, as shown in a number of studies,96 
and the fear of crime is disproportionate to reality. This over-reaction could be better 
described as continuance of ‘Othering’ those who are different, and ethnic 
nationalism, leading to the criminalization of entire communities and cultures, rather 
than mere individuals. That Italy increasingly penalizes asylum-seekers entails a clear 
shift from ‘democracy’ to ‘security’ in a world of citizenship and people circulation. 
Despite using wide discretional power, the State authorities have not yet been able 
either to prevent the upsurge in ‘illegal immigration’ or to resolve its true causes. 
Though as de Haas97 has argued, restrictive migration policies rather than ‘solving’ 
this issue, produce more ‘illegality’ over time. In turn, the problem’s persistence has 
pushed public institutions ‘to adopt even more restrictive policies’. Interestingly, 
there is a well-established attitude among Italian mainstream society to sustain the 
emergency policies constantly reiterated by the government.98 
Between Intercultural rhetoric and Ethnocentric practices 
In the last decade, a growing interest around a new intercultural approach led a 
number of governments, particularly in Western Europe, to re-think their policies 
towards the management of cultural diversity.99 While multicultural policies were 
experiencing increasing distrust, the intercultural paradigm emerged almost in 
opposition to it. The 9/11 terrorist attack in the US was a watershed moment. During 
the following three years (200204) the Secretary General of the Council launched an 
integrated project, titled Responses to Violence in Everyday Life in a Democratic 
Society, containing policy recommendations about combating violence in everyday 
life. In this context, Violence, Conflict and Intercultural Dialogue was ‘the fifth in a 
series of publications designed to acquaint the reader with recommendations or 
instruments used to launch Council of Europe (COE) activities and projects on 
violence prevention’. 100  The year 2008 was even proclaimed European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue by the European Parliament and the member States of the 
European Union (EU). During the same year the White Paper on Intercultural 
Dialogue was launched by the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, arguing 
that interculturalism should be the preferred model for managing cultural diversity in 
Europe. The intercultural trend was also welcomed by the UNESCO in its 2008 
																																																								
96 D. Van Dijck, Is the EU on illegal migration securitized? yes of course! a study into the dynamics of 
institutionalized securitization, paper to be presented at the 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 
Istanbul, 21-23 September, 2006; H. de Haas and N. Sigona, ‘Migration and revolution’, Forced Migration 
Review, no. 39, 2012, pp. 4-5. 
97 H. de Haas, The myth of invasion: Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European 
Union, International Migration Institute, 2007, 
http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/Irregular%20migration%20from%20West%20Africa%20-
%20Hein%20de%20Haas.pdf, p. 65. 
98 N. Pagnoncelli, ‘Un italiano su due è contro gli sbarchi ma dice sì a cittadinanza immigrati’ [An Italian every two 
is against immigrant landings, but is in favour of giving them citizenship], Corriere della Sera, 26 October, 2014, 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2014/ottobre/26/italiano_due_contro_gli_sbarchi_co_0_20141026_569663aa
-5cdb-11e4-a22a-1b2843529fe0.shtml; P. Isernia and F. Olmastroni, ‘Images of the immigrant: European public 
opinion and immigration’, in M. Ceccorulli and N. Labanca (eds), The EU, Migration and the Politics of 
Administrative Detention, Routledge, New York, 2014, pp. 59-78. 
99 R. Zapata-Barrero, ‘What Is an Intercultural Policy? A Comprehensive View’, 2013,  
http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/what-is-an-intercultural-policy-a-comprehensive-view/#comments 
100 J.F. Bourquin, Violence, conflict and intercultural dialogue. Peace Palace Library. 2003, 
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/Coe21.pdf, p. 3. 
Armillei, ANZJES 8(2) 
 
46 
World Report on Cultural Diversity, which somehow signed the beginning of a more 
global consensus.101   
In terms of the Italian context, the fact that a multicultural paradigm has never taken 
root here places the country in a unique position within the European context. But 
while multiculturalism has been described as a ‘missing model’ in Italy,102 at the 
beginning of the 1990s a lively debate on intercultural issues started to emerge 
instead. It was in 1990 that the Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Universita’ e della 
Ricerca (Ministry of Education, Universities and Research) introduced the concept of 
‘intercultural education’ for the first time. In the ‘Circolare Ministeriale’ (Ministerial 
Memo) No. 205/90 it provided the following definition: 
The primary goal of intercultural education is the promotion of a constructive 
coexistence within a composite cultural and social framework. Not only does it 
entail acceptance and respect of the other, it also promotes the recognition of 
cultural diversity while encouraging dialogue, mutual understanding and 
mutual transformation.103  
In 2007, Italy even claimed its own model of cultural diversity: La Via Italiana per la 
Scuola Interculturale e l’Integrazione degli Alunni Stranieri (‘The Italian way to 
intercultural schooling and the integration of foreign students’). In other words, the 
new intercultural paradigm was introduced mainly as a response to the growing 
presence of foreign students within the Italian educational system. According to 
Gobbo, intercultural education emerged as the most ‘desirable answer aimed to teach 
respect for, and to valorize, the different cultural orientations now present in 
schools’.104 
But while promoting mutual knowledge and understanding of the many and various 
cultural differences that exist in our societies, Gobbo also recognizes that ignoring the 
persistence of discrepancies in power and equality of opportunities bestowed on 
people of different cultures, has transformed the aim of mutual understanding and 
equity into empty rhetoric. The Italian intercultural model is certainly based on a 
dynamic conception of culture which acknowledges ‘cultural relativism’ while 
promoting social cohesion and the building of common values. Yet, although its 
theoretical stance would argue in favour of a dialogical praxis, it does not seem able 
to move beyond the existence of hegemonic points of view, which have the power to 
generate an uneven dialogue between a ‘dialoguer’ and ‘dialoguee’.105 Another critical 
aspect of interculturalism in Italy was highlighted by Love and Varghese.106 According 
to them, little space is generally dedicated to issues of racism in the schooling system, 
and in Italian society more broadly. Not only is intercultural education unable to 
address the lived experiences of xenophobia and racism in the ccontemporary anti-
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immigration political climate of Italy, but it also does not contextualize them as ‘being 
rooted in a long history of race and linguistic based nationalism’.107 With this regard, 
Love and Varghese suggest that the introduction of critical race theory (CRT) – which 
has been hardly applied pedagogically –, more than intercultural dialogue, might 
help to challenge the exclusive character of Italian national identity. Combating 
dominant ideology through counter-narrative voices of those who experienced racism 
and discrimination is described as a valuable technique in the classroom. 
With the official aim to foster tolerance of ethnic heterogeneity Italy adopted its own 
cross-cultural paradigm towards cultural diversity. This paper suggests that, despite 
established rhetoric emphasizing inclusion, supposedly providing ‘non-core groups’ 
with more political participation, influence, and improvement of status, Italy’s policy 
approach could be better described as a form of ‘political rhetoric/theatre’,108 with the 
implicit assumption that inclusion is into some ‘mythical mainstream’. Rather than 
political unification, it was Mussolini’s Fascist doctrine, calling for the absolute 
primacy of the State, which created a collective sense of national unity based on a 
supposed Italian ethnic unity. With the end of the Second World War, the previous 
discriminatory government doctrine was not dismantled. The model of ‘ethnic 
democracy’ elaborated by Smooha, can help to frame the presence of people forced to 
live within a society but with no recognised right of belonging. Instead of renouncing 
its traditional, structured dominance, there are clear signs of an Italian ‘core ethnic’ 
majority trying to make the new emerging democracy serve them in a form of ‘ethnic 
democracy’. Recent authoritarian approaches,109 particularly directed against ‘non-
core’ ethno-cultural groups, promote an ongoing sense of threat which represents one 
of the conditions for this type of democracy to survive.  
Smooha refers to ‘ethnicity’, not ‘citizenry’, as the cornerstone of a type of democracy 
characterized by the inherent contradiction between ethnic ascendance and civic 
equality. He used the term ‘diminished’ democracy to describe a state that rather 
than serving all its citizens equally, it privileges the majority and strives to advance its 
interest. 110  In this context, the ‘ethnic nation’, while shaping symbols, laws and 
policies of the state for the benefit of the majority, create the ‘others’ as less desirable 
people who cannot be full members of the society. The criminalization of Romanies 
and illegal migrants, by media and the Italian political class alike, led to their 
inevitable and progressive distancing from political life. With increasingly stricter 
qualifying rules for naturalization, citizenship, often considered as a crucial 
instrument for integration into mainstream society, became a mere chimera for 
‘alien’ groups. Even when they are born on national soil, they still do not have 
citizenship rights due to the prevailing norm of ‘ius sanguinis’ (the principle that a 
person’s nationality at birth is the same as that of his/her natural parents) and, more 
broadly, to the lack of political engagement with the issue.111  
 
Conclusion 
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In a globalized world the existence of multicultural societies has become an 
indisputable fact, even when the ‘politics of recognition’ are not in place. As Nye112 
puts it, multiculturalism is not an optional extra that a society can choose to have or 
avoid. Yet, Allievi113 argues, the Italian society is going through a phase characterised 
by reactive identities and cultural conflict which is ‘producing a diffused anti-
multiculturalist opinion, even though multiculturalist policies have not been openly 
implemented’. For many years after political unification, the idea of migration was 
‘limited to the internal movement of Italians migrating from the South to the North 
of the country and Southerners represented the foreign component of an increasingly 
multicultural society’.114 Since the 1990s, though, mainly in response to new waves of 
immigration, various forms of extremism have emerged and dominated the Italian 
political scene, by playing with the mainstream fears in order to implement 
emergency-type of measures against them. While shifting public attention towards 
this new emerging issue, the Lega Nord, in particular, was able to induce other more 
established parties of the Right, but occasionally the Left as well, to adopt a similar 
approach towards immigration.115 
In the context of a society which is still trying to come to terms with its past and to 
establish a collective sense of identity, the rise of ‘ethnonationalism’, historical 
amnesia and revisionism are all factors that have contributed to exclude ‘Othered’ 
communities from a contemporary notion of ‘Italianness’. Only recently race-oriented 
studies have started to show that ‘various forms of racism have played in the history 
and even in the formation of Italy as a nation and, indeed, in the creation of the 
“Italian identity”’.116 During the Liberal and Fascist periods, for instance, colonialism 
was used to create and re-produce a strong sense of nationhood, re-composing the 
many internal divisions by racialising ‘otherness’ outside rather than inside the 
nation’s borders. This study suggests that today, by pathologizing the ‘Others’ and 
their cultures as ungovernable or prone to violence, crime and social collapse, the 
same ‘colonial logic’ shapes the institutional approach towards cultural diversity. The 
implementation of highly restrictive anti-immigration policies, not only is allowing 
the ‘myth of Italian kindness and moral superiority’117  to re-emerge, but is also 
contributing to install what Smooha defines ‘ethnic democracy’.    
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